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Troubled Banks and Thrifts
Our financial system has had many difficulties in
recent years. Banks and thrifts have failed in
record highnumbers since the Great Depres-
sion; the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation faces financial troubles; and trou-
bled institutions stiJI are operating.
"Troubled" (insolvent or near-insolvent) institu-
tions appear to be most prevalent in the thrift
industry, but the banking sector is far from free
of similar institutions. There are about 1,600
banks on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration's problem bank list. Moreover, since
many institutions' bookvalues exceed their mar-
ket values, current book value accounting prac-
tices most likely understate the number of
institutions that are insolvent on a market value
basis.
This Letter examines the consequences of allow-
ing troubled institutions to continue in operation
- a policy known as capital forbearance. It
argues that the best policy would be to require
such institutions to bolster their capital and, if
they were unable to do so, to sell or close those
institutions. However, should such a policy be
politically unfeasible, the second-best policy
would be to limiUhe damage such institutions
can inflict on the economy.
Underpriced deposit insurance
In a world of fixed-rate deposit insurance, under
which a bank's or thrift's cost of insured deposits
is independent of its risk-taking, regulation is
needed to limit the exposure of the insurance
fund. The reason is that an insured institution
would earn profits on successful investment out-
comes while the insurance fund would absorb
losses that exceeded the institution's capital on
unsuccessful ones.
In a system of full insurance coverage, insured
institutions could earn virtually unlimited profits
by attracting funds at a risk-free rate and invest-
ing them in higher yielding risky projects. That
is, without regulation and tinder our current
deposit insurance system (which underprices
risk), insured financial institutions would expand
at the expense of their uninsured competitors.
Market value closure
One way to contain such risk-taking is to require
or induce insured institutions to hold sufficient
capital, depending on their asset risk (credit and
interest rate risk) and the length oftime between
supervisory examinations. Sufficient capital
ensures that the institutions' equityholders, and
not the insurance fund, bear the full risk of any
loss. This principle underlies the current pro-
posals for risk-based capital that would require
banks with riskier asset portfolios to hold more
capital. For example, if an institution can be
closed before the market value of its net worth
falls below zero, that institution's equityholders
would bear the full consequences of its risk-
taking.
Moreover, if institutions know with certainty that
theywill be sold or closed with a positive (mar-
ket value) net worth (say, one percent of assets),
and thus lose their capital in the process, they
would have an incentive voluntarily to hold suf-
ficient capital relative to the asset risk oftheir
portfolios to avoid such regulatory "bankruptcy"
costs. Even if this closure policy could not be
implemented in such a way that banks always
were closed before their net worth fell below
zero, requiring more capital would still reduce
the incentive of insured institutions.to increase
asset risk.
Such a system might have been able to forestall
the severe difficulties our financial system faces
today. But now, after the kind of trauma our
depository indystry has experienced over the last
15 years, it may be politically impossible to
implement. What, then, should be done, and, in
particular, how should weak or insolvent institu-
tions be handled? Is it possible to move toward a
market value closure rule without closing large
numbers of institutions?
Insolvent institutions
Those insured institutions that are insolvent on a
market value basis but are still operating pose
the greatest risk to the deposit insurance funds,
to solvent banks and thrifts, and to the stabiIity
of the entire financial system. To see why, con-
sider the incentives ofthe owners of such
institutions.FRBSF
First, such institutions have very strong incen-
tives to increase the riskiness of their asset port-
folios. Since they stand to gain from profitable
investments and loans but have no equity to lose
ifthe investments and loans prove unprofitable,
they will seek large payoffs that occur with low
probabilities. Unfortunately, such "bet the
bank" strategies are all too common. Moreover,
such institutions will even undertake invest-
ments where the average return is less than the
cost of their funds, as long as there is a chance
of a payoff that exceeds the cost of their funds.
Second, such institutions have a strong incentive
to expand assets funded with insured deposits.
The reason is that a larger asset base increases
their gain when investments are profitable. But,
there is no countervailing loss when the invest-
ments are not profitable, as there would be for
an uninsured institution. Moreover, insured
institutions would be willing and able to pay
above market rates for insured deposits in order
to grow as rapidly as possible. This strategy of
trying to "grow" out of past mistakes also is all
too common.
The risks of these strategies for the deposit insur-
ance funds are evident. Absent efforts to contain
the risk-taking and expansionary behavior of
insolvent institutions, only good luck will pre-
vent the insurance funds themselves from facing
ever-increasing losses.
Competing institutions
Less well-recognized are the implications of
such behavior for solvent banks and thrifts com-
peting with insolvent institutions. It is very diffi-
cult for solvent institutions that have positive
capital to compete with insolvent ones that in
effect are operating with no capital. Absent reg-
ulation, on the liability side, insolvent institu-
tions will outbid solvent institutions to achieve
rapid asset growth. Similarly, on the asset side,
insolvent institutions will underbid solvent com-
petitors by underpricing loans and other
investments.
Since, under certain circumstances, insolvent
institutions left unchecked would expand even
when the expected return on their loans and
investments is less than their cost of funds, sol-
vent institutions them'selves eventually may even
be driven toward insolvency as they face mar-
ket-determined asset returns that are too low to
cover the cost of their liabilities.
As mentioned above, the best solution to these
problems would be to sell or close insolvent
institutions promptly. Doing so would not only
contain the damage they can do to the financial
system, but also provide a greater incentive for
solvent institutions voluntarily to hold asset port-
folios that are prudent in relation to their capital
positions (to lessen the risk they would be sold
or closed).
There is no economic benefit to protecting the
owners of insolvent institutions. An institution is
insolvent on a market value basis by definition
only when its discounted expected cash pay-
ments (to depositors and other liability holders)
exceed its expected discounted cash receipts
(from loans and investments). Only an unex-
pected event will return such an institution to
solvency.
As mentioned above, it may be politically
impossible after-the-fact, to close a large number
of institutions. The time for a strict closure policy
is before institutions get into trouble, so that
massive closures are not needed. Nevertheless,
to contain the adverse effects such institutions
can have, it is important that they be highly
regulated.
Needed regulations
To keep troubled institutions from imposing
even larger losses on the insurance funds and
driving solvent competitors toward insolvency,
they should not be permitted to grow or be
allowed to increase the riskiness of their assets.
One way to limit their potential harm would be
to prohibit them from acquiring any new assets
or issuing new insured liabilities. Although such
a policy of "freezing" their assets and liabilities
probably would force many ofthem to die a
slow death as their loans matured, a slow death
that contained losses is preferable to the poten-
tially much larger losses that could occur absent
asset growth and risk-taking restrictions.
Since the owners of such moribund institutions
would have little incentive to run them effi-
ciently, such stop-gap measures should be tem-
porary while a buyer for the institution is sought.
Although other policies, such as deposit rate
ceilings for insured deposits (at the rate for com-
parable Treasury instruments, for example) and/
or requiring additional capital for new growth,
may be partly successful in containing the tend-
ency of these institutions to grow, stringent asset
portfolio risk restrictions still would be needed
to contain the risk exposure of the deposit insur-
ance system.Troubled but still solvent
Although institutions that are insolvent on a mar-
ket value basis pose the gravest threat to the
insurance funds and the financial system, institu-
tions near insolvency also pose a similar threat.
For example, an institution with capital insuffi-
cient to protect the deposit insurance fund from
losses in the event the institution's assets pro-
duce low returns has incentives similar to an
insolvent institution. In fact, any institution that
can shift potential losses onto the insurance
agency (in excess of its deposit insurance pre-
mium) has incentives to grow and increase asset
risk.
To reduce or eliminate these incentives for
damaging behavior, weak institutions should be
required to bolster their capital-to-asset ratios by
an amount dependent on the riskiness of their
asset portfolios.
Institutions could increase their capital ratios
either by issuing new equity or perpetual subor-
dinated debt, by selling assets and retiring
insured deposits with the proceeds, or by retain-
ing earnings (if available). From a regulatory per-
spective, an institution that refuses to bolster its
capital or that cannot do so, should be treated
just like an insolvent institution (Le., ideally, it
should be sold or closed; failing that, it should
not be permitted to acquire any new assets).
It might be noted that increasing deposit insur-
ance premium assessments of solvent institutions
to bailout insolvent ones (for example, by rais-
ing the deposit insurance premium uniformly
across all institutions) will not solve the basic
problems discussed. Higher premiums unrelated
to risk alone do nothing to contain the socially
damaging risk-taking incentives ofvalue-
maximizing insolvent institutions. Moreover,
higher premiums applied to only one sector of
the industry, such as the current higher deposit
insurance premium for thrifts, would cause that
sector to shrink relative to sectors paying lower
premiums, all other things equal.
Although solvent institutions should support pol-
icies such as those discussed above that limit
destructive competition, weak or insolvent
institutions may resist such policy actions
because the actions reduce their shareholders'
wealth. One way to lessen this resistance is to
compensate shareholders at least partially by
offering to enhance the franchise values of the
institutions involved. For example, an expanded
range of powers - such as investment banking,
insurance sales and underwriting, and real estate
investment and brokerage - could be allowed
for firms that complied with more stringent capi-
tal and closure requirements. In fact, the pro-
posed repeal of Glass-Steagall seems to be a step
in this direction, although expanded powers
under the proposal do not appear to be tied to
more stringent capital regulation or closure
policy.
Summary and conclusions
Solving the financial problems of some of our
insured depository institutions will not be easy.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to see
that such policies as market value closure and
risk-based capital requirements, if they had been
in place a number of years ago would have
reduced the severity of today's problems.
Nevertheless, there are still measures that can be
taken with regard to troubled institutions to
ensure th<;lt problems do not worsen in the
future. For one, troubled institutions should be
required to bolster their (market value) capital
ratios in relation to the risk of their portfolios
(both credit and interest rate risk). If this is not
possible, they should ideally be sold or closed,
or at the very least not permitted to acquire new
assets or insured deposits.
Institutions still operating even though they are
insolvent on a market value basis pose a grave
threat both to the solvency of the deposit insur-
ance funds and to the stability and competitive-
ness of the rest ofthe depository industry. If left
unchecked, such institutions, will expand and
increase asset risk, conceivably even driving sol-
vent institutions toward insolvency. Without
strict regulation and supervision, solvent insti-
tutions that are weak in capital pose a similar
threat.
The steps proposed here would go a long way
toward containing the losses already incurred,
and would allow the industry to make the transi-
tion to a new structure better able to deal with
risk.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 207,821 - 169 - 6,416 - 2.9
Loans and Leases1 6 184,030 33 - 9,535 - 4.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,554 121 - 4,624 - 8.0
Real estate 72,538 - 123 4,621 6.8
Loans to Individuals 37,648 167 - 4,312 - 10.2
Leases 5,450 13 - 141 - 2.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,421 - 255 2,953 21.9
Other Securities2 7,370 54 164 2.2
Total Deposits 209,812 1,484 - 14,081 - 6.2
Demand Deposits 55,242 1,629 - 12,968 - 19.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 39,296 2,980 - 2,425 - 5.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,217 24 164 0.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,353 - 169 - 1,277 - 0.9
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,898 16 - 3,204 - 6.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,647 - 191 - 761 - 2.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,453 302 - 7,523 - 27.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change